



THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
 
 
WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS 
 
 




School of Economics 
College of Business and Economics 





Working Paper No. 480 
 
 










Indices of voting power are intended to measure the a priori degree of in￿ uence that
a voter or party can expect to have in framing legislation or passing motions. Com-
monly used measures include those proposed by Shapley and Shubik (1954), Banzhaf
(1965) and Deegan and Packel (1978). This paper computes these power indices for
the Australian Senate for the period 1901-2004. The introduction of the Single Trans-
ferable Vote in the Senate in 1949 appears to have had a profound e⁄ect on the voting
power of both major parties, as well as on the degree of concentration of voting power.
1 Introduction
The Australian Department of the Senate claims that ￿proportional representation is a some-
what complicated electoral system, which ensures that political parties gain representation
in proportion to their share of the vote. The result has been that the membership of the
Senate is now a truer re￿ ection of the voters￿support of the di⁄erent political parties.￿ 1
Whether this is indeed the case is open to question, for the notion of what exactly is
meant by a ￿true re￿ ection of voters￿support￿has been under sustained attack ever since
the work of Arrow (1963) and Gibbard (1973) and Sattherthwaite (1974). Even if we accept
that proportional representation re￿ ects voters￿true preferences in the number of seats, raw
numbers of seats do not always translate into political power.
The concept of voting power and indices of voting power can be used to address these
issues. This note computes power indices for parties in the Australian Senate for the period
￿School of Economics, College of Business and Economics, Australian National University, Canberra,
ACT, 2600, Australia. Email: alex.robson@anu.edu.au Ph +61 2 6125 4909. This paper was prepared for
the 2007 Australian Law and Economics Conference, 1-2 June, Rydges Lakeside Hotel, Canberra.
1See Senate Brief No 1 (September 2006) ￿Electing Australia￿ s Senators￿ at
http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/pubs/briefs/brief01.htm
11901-2004, and compares indices of voting power to actual fractions of seats held. We also
develop and compute a summary measure of concentration of voting power, which is closely
related to existing measures of concentration found in the industrial organisation and public
choice literature.
2 Measures of Voting Power
2.1 Background: Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility
Consider a set of N agents. A cooperative game in such a group consists of a feasible
utility set for the grand coalition N, as well as a utility set for every non-empty subset of N,
including the coalitions with only one agent. Therefore, there are 2N ￿1 possible non-empty
subsets, for which we need to assign a utility possibility set, which is just a list of utilities
that each agent gets if various coalitions happen to form.
In a game with transferable utility, each such utility set is a feasible set of cooperative
opportunities: if the agents in a given coalition can all agree on the utility set, they can
enforce any utility distribution in this set. The course of action which must be taken to
achieve this distribution is ignored. This means that there is only one number associated
with each coalition (namely the sum of the utilities of individuals in that coalition), instead
of a vector of utilities.
More formally, a coalitional or cooperative game with transferable payo⁄ or transferable
utility (a TU game) consists of a ￿nite set N of players and a function v : P(N) ! R
(where P(N) is the set of all subsets of agents) that represents the worth v(S) of the the
coalition S ￿ N. The function v(S) is the primitive data of the model and is called the
characteristic function of the game. An allocation or imputation is a collection of utilities
fxi : i 2 Ng. An allocation is feasible if
P
i2N xi = v(N). The set of all imputations for a
game is denoted by E(v).
2.1.1 Simple and Weighted Majority Games
The general model described above can be applied to legislatures with only a few minor
modi￿cations. If a particular motion or piece of legislation is before the legislature, the
motion will either pass or not pass (fail). If motions must pass by a strict majority of
legislators voting in favour, then (in the absence of abstentions) there are only two relevant
kinds of coalitions that can form: those which can force a motion to pass (winning coalitions),
and those which cannot (losing coalitions).
Without loss of generality, with transferable utility we can set v (S) = 1 if S is winning,
2and v (S) = 0 if S is not winning, so that:
v (S) =
￿
1 if jSj > N
2
0 if jSj ￿ N
2
(1)
The game in (1) is called a simple majority game. We can use this model of simple games
for legislatures because every coalition that forms is either winning or losing, with nothing
in between.
The Australian Senate is comprised of members of various political parties, and to the
extent that there is tight party discipline, we can also model the Senate as a weighted majority
game. This consists of a set N of agents, a collection of weights fwi > 0 : i = 1;:::;Ng and
a quota q. We represent a weighted majority game by:
[q;w1;:::;wN]




Setting q = N
2 +1 and wi = 1 for all i gets us back to the situation in which each legislator is
regarded as an individual voter. If party i wins wi seats and there is tight party discipline
(so that each party always votes on issues as a bloc), then we have a weighted majority





i2S wi ￿ q
0 if
P
i2S wi < q
2.2 Voting Power and Indices of Voting Power
The motivation behind the concept of voting power can be illustrated using the following
simple example. In the very ￿rst Australian Senate following the election on 29 March 1901,
the distribution of Senate seats among the parties was as follows:
Party Protectionist Free Trade ALP
Seats 11 17 8












With 36 Senators in total, to pass a motion in the Senate a party would require a clear
majority or 19 votes. So in the 1901 Senate, no party could pass legislation on its own ￿
3the fact that the Free Trade Party had a plurality of seats was irrelevant as far the practical
consideration of actually passing laws was concerned. Indeed, the Protectionists and the
ALP could form a coalition and pass legislation without needing any Free Trade votes, which
is what actually occurred in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.2
This situation illustrates the proposition that using raw numbers of seats to determine
political power or in￿ uence is clearly inappropriate. Because all of the winning coalitions in
the above game require at least two of the parties, none of them could be said to have more
political in￿ uence that the other. Any reasonable measure of voting power should have each
party having equal power or in￿ uence.
The concept of voting power simply formalises this reality that raw numbers of seats
are not always a good indicator of how likely certain political parties or individuals will be
pivotal in the sense that they can turn a losing coalition into a winning one. We now turn
to three such measures that have been developed and used in the literature.
2.2.1 The Shapley-Shubik Power Index
Shapley and Shubik (1954) introduced an index for measuring an individual￿ s voting power
in a committee. They consider all n! possible arrangements of voters. They view a voter￿ s
power as the a priori probability that he will be pivotal in some arrangement of voters.
Pivotalness requires that:
1. If every voter before i in the arrangement votes in favour of the bill, and if every voter
after i in the arrangement votes against the bill, then the bill would fail; and
2. If voter i and every voter before i in the arrangement votes in favour of the bill, and if
every voter after i in the arrangement votes against the bill, then the bill would pass.
The Shapley-Shubik power index for voter i is simply the number of arrangements of
voters in which voter i satis￿es the two conditions above, divided by the total number of
arrangements of voters. It therefore assigns a player the probability that the voter will cast
the deciding vote if all arrangements of voters are equally likely. The expected frequency
with which a party or voter is the pivot, over all possible alignments of the voters, is an
indication of the voter￿ s power. 3
2The Protectionists held 31 seats in the House of Representatives, with the Free Traders holding 28 and
the ALP 14. There were two independents. The Protectionists (led by Prime Minister Edmund Barton),
passed the White Australia Policy, tari⁄s, and industrial arbitration laws all with the support of the ALP.
Bolton (2000, at page 31) concludes that the promise of the White Australia Policy guaranteed ALP support
for the Protectionists.
3Gul (1989) provides a non-cooperative foundation to the Shapley value.
4Consider all possible orderings of the N voters, legislators or parties, and consider all the
ways in which a winning coalition can be built up. There are N! possible orderings of the
players. For each one of these orderings, some unique player will join the coalition and turn
it from a losing coalition into a winning coalition. In other words, there will be a unique
pivotal voter for each possible permutation of voters. The number of times that player i is




Number of arrangements in which i is pivotal
N!
where it is assumed that each of the N! alignments is equally probable. If S is a winning
coalition and S ￿ fig is losing, then i is pivotal. Let s = jSj. Given the size of S, the
number of ways of arranging the previous s￿1 voters is (s ￿ 1)!. Also, the number of ways
in which the remaining (N ￿ s) voters can be arranged is (N ￿ s)!. Therefore, given S, the
total number of ways that voter i can be pivotal is simply:






S: i is pivotal
(s ￿ 1)!(N ￿ s)!
N!
(2)
[see, for example, Owen (1995), page 265 or Felsenthal and Machover (1998) page 197].4 To
illustrate how to compute this index, let us go back to the 1901 election results and consider



















for i = P;FT;ALP
On the other hand, consider the 1910 election. In that election the results give the following






Calculations are even more straightforward here. The Liberal Party is never pivotal here,
and the ALP is always pivotal. Therefore:
’
SS
ALP = 1 and ’
SS
Liberal = 0




52.2.2 The Banzhaf Power Index
Banzhaf￿ s (1965) index is also concerned with the fraction of possibilities in which a voter is
pivotal, but only considers the combinations of such possibilities, rather than permutations.
In other words, Banzaf￿ s approach does not worry about the order in which voters are
arranged. To distinguish between the Banzhaf approach and the Shapley-Shubik approach,
consider any winning coalition S [ fig. If i leaves this group and S turns into a losing
coalition, then i is said to be critical (the ways in which the coalition S can be arranged are
ignored). The (normalised) Banzhaf power index of voter i is the number of coalitions in
which i is critical, divided by the total number of all such coalitions in which some voter is









where ￿i is the number of coalitions in which i is critical (also known as the number of
￿swings￿for i). Returning to the 1901 election results, the coalitions in which some player
i is critical are fP;FTg, fFT;ALPg and fALP;Pg. Therefore,
N X
j=1






for i = P;FT;ALP
which is the same as ’SS
i (this need not always be the case). On the other hand, consider
again the 1910 election. We get:
’
Bz
ALP = 1 and ’
Bz
Liberal = 0
which, again, is the same as ’SS
i .
2.2.3 The Deegan-Packel Index
Another index of voting power that has received some attention in the literature is that
proposed by Deegan and Packel (1978). Their measure is based on the notion of minimal
winning coalitions (MWCs), which are coalitions that become losing if any single voter is
removed.5 Following Riker￿ s (1962) size principle, they argue that coalitions exceeding the
minimal winning ones will not form (why bother recruiting more supporters if your coalition
is already winning?) They also assume that each MWC is equally likely, and that members
of MWCs split any gains equally.
5Note that this is not the same thing as i being critical. Player i can be critical and turn a winning
coalition into a losing one, but that does not mean that other players in the coalition are also critical. In
other words, a minimal winning coalition is one in which all members are critical.
6These assumptions uniquely determine the following power index. Suppose that player
i is a member of the minimal winning coalitions fS1;S2;:::;SKig, which have s1;s2;:::;sKi














Returning to the 1901 election results, note that the minimal winning coalitions are fP;FTg,














for i = P;FT;ALP
which, again, is the same as ’SS
i and ’Bz
i (again, this need not always be the case). On
the other hand, consider again the 1910 election. The minimal winning coalition is simply
fALPg, and so we get:
’
DP
ALP = 1 and ’
DP
Liberal = 0




3.1 Background: Australian Senate Elections, 1901-2004
I computed the Shapley Shubik Index, Normalised Banzhaf Index, and Deegan-Packel Index
for the every political party (including independents) in every Australian Senate for the
years 1901 to 2004 under two di⁄erent assumptions. The ￿rst set of estimates assumes
that all parties are separate entities and do not collude or form long run agreements with
one another. In particular, this assumption means that the Liberal Party and the National
Party might potentially vote di⁄erently on any given piece of legislation.
The second set of estimates begins in 1949, and uses the fact that since 1949 the Liberal
and National parties have formed the Coalition when in government and in opposition.
Under this second assumption, the Coalition is treated as a single party. Computing the
7power indices using these two di⁄erent assumptions allows us to compute the gains (or losses)
from this power-sharing arrangement and to investigate how they have changed over time
and how they have impacted on the voting power of other parties.
In interpreting and discussing the estimates below, there are several other key institu-
tional developments that should be kept in mind.6
1. Plurality Voting: From 1901 to 1917, Australia had a plurality voting system in both
houses.7 In the Senate, all states used the ￿block vote￿(a generalisation of the plurality
voting system for multi-member constituencies).
2. Preferential Voting: The 1918 Commonwealth Electoral Act introduced the alternative
vote in the House of Representatives and preferential block voting in the Senate.
3. Proportional Representation: In 1949 the Single Transferable Vote (STV) was intro-
duced in the Senate.8
4. Size: The number of senators increased in each state in 1949 (36 to 60), 1975 (60 to 64),
and 1984 (64 to 76). In Senate elections usually only half the Senators face re-election.
Double dissolutions were held in 1914, 1951, 1974, 1975, 1983 and 1987.
5. Compulsory Voting: Compulsory voting at Federal Elections was introduced in 1924.
Items 1 and 2 on this list are of particular interest here because according to Duverger￿ s
Law, whether a voting system is preferential or not determines the e⁄ective number of parties
that compete in elections, which will also in￿ uence the indices of voting power.9 A compan-
ion paper [Robson (2007)] to this paper provides an empirical analysis of the consequences
of the 1918 Electoral Act for the e⁄ective number of parties in both houses of parliament.
6Farrell and McAllister (2006) provide an excellent analysis and summary of voting methods used in
Australian elections since Federation.
7The only exception was the 1901 election, in which the various states were allowed to used their own
systems. In the House of Representatives, NSW, VIC and WA used the plurality voting system. In the
Senate, all states used the ￿block vote￿ , or multi-member plurality. A companion paper [Robson (2007)]
to this paper provides an empirical analysis of the consequences of the 1918 Electoral Act for the e⁄ective
number of parties in both houses of parliament.
8The actual counting of Senate votes works as follows. Suppose the quota is 100 votes, and that
candidate A receives 200 ￿rst preference votes. A wins a Senate seat. A "transfer value" is calculated
for A￿ s surplus vote, which is equal to his surplus votes divided by his total, which here is 100/200 = 1/2.
Then, each of these 200 ballots is scrutinsed to determined the second preferences of these voters. Suppose,
for example, that 50 voters ranked candidate B second. Then these 50 votes are multiplied by A￿ s transfer
value (1/2) to give a total of 25, which is then added to the number of ￿rst placed votes which B receives.
If after this process no other candidate reaches the quota, the candidate with the lowest number of votes
is excluded. Their second preferences are distributed among the other candidates, at full value, just as they
are in House of Representatives elections.
9See Duverger (1963)
8Data on election results were obtained from http://elections.uwa.edu.au.10 This data is
in turn partly based on Hughes and Graham (1968). Under the ￿rst assumption, for the
current Senate the power indices for each party are:11
Table 1: Voting Power in the 2004 Senate (￿rst assumption)






ALP (28) 0:36842 0:17619 0:15888 0:10455
Liberals (33) 0:43421 0:44286 0:43925 0:24242
Nationals (5) 0:06579 0:14286 0:14019 0:1803
Democrats (4) 0:05263 0:07619 0:08411 0:12424
Greens (4) 0:05263 0:07619 0:08411 0:12424
Family First (1) 0:01316 0:04286 0:04673 0:11212
Country Liberals (1) 0:01316 0:04286 0:04673 0:11212
On the other hand, under the second assumption we get:
Table 2: Voting Power in the 2004 Senate (second assumption)






ALP (28) 0:36842 0:03333 0:02778 0:1
Coalition (38) 0:5 0:83333 0:86111 0:5
Democrats (4) 0:05263 0:03333 0:02778 0:1
Greens (4) 0:05263 0:03333 0:02778 0:1
Family First (1) 0:01316 0:03333 0:02778 0:1
Country Liberals (1) 0:01316 0:03333 0:02778 0:1
Under the second assumption, the ALP￿ s voting power drops dramatically and for all
indices is the same as the minor parties and independents. If we assume that the Country
Liberal party Senator (Senator Nigel Scullion of the Northern Territory) joins the Coalition
on every vote, then the Coalition has an absolute majority and all power indices become 1
for the Coalition. Scullion is a Minister and is also Deputy Leader of the Nationals in the
Senate, so table 2 may not provide a true picture of a priori voting power in the current
Senate. On the other hand, the National Party￿ s Senator Barnaby Joyce has not voted with
10See Sharman (2002) for comments on this website as a resource for political scientists and other re-
searchers.
11To maintain consistency with data over the 1901-2001 period, the numbers used are for the party
a¢ liations of Senators immediately after their election. Following the 2004 election, Victorian Senator
Julian McGauran defected from the Nationals to the Liberal Party. This would a⁄ect the results in table
1, but not table 2 below which treats the Liberals and Nationals as a single voting bloc.
9the Coalition on every motion or bill before the current Senate. If we regard Joyce as an
independent voter, table 2 again becomes relevant for assessing voting power in the current
Senate, with Joyce￿ s voting power replacing Scullion￿ s in table 2.
3.2 Voting Power of the ALP: 1901-2004
Figure 1 presents the three measures of voting power discussed above for the Australian
Labor Party between 1901 and 2004, together with the fraction of Senate seats held by the
ALP.12















% Seats SS Bz DP
For the ALP the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices track each other closely over the
entire history of the Senate ￿and indeed all indices give the same results up until 1953.
Each index indicates that before the 1910 election, the ALP, Protectionists and Free Traders
(called the ￿Anti-Socialists￿in 1907) shared voting power equally. Even though the ALP
held a plurality of seats in 1904 and 1907, this did not transfer into greater voting power.
In 1910 the ALP won both houses and had a clear majority in the Senate until 1917, at
which point the ALP split over conscription. 11 ALP Senators formed a coalition with the
12Full results for all parties between 1901 and 2004 are available in spreadsheet form upon request.
10Liberals to form the Nationalists, who then held a clear majority (24 of 36) of Senate seats.
Thus ALP power (using all indices) falls to zero in 1917 and remains at that level until 1937.
Following the 1943 election the ALP again held a majority (22 of 36) seats, and their voting
power was one until the 1949 election.
The post 1949 period is interesting for two reasons. First, the number of Senators
nearly doubled in 1949, to 60. Second, Senate elections moved to the Single Transferable
Vote method, a form of proportional representation. Figure 1 suggests that these reforms
coincided with the beginning of a what appears to be a long-term downward trend in the
fraction of Senate seats held by the ALP. This trend has lasted 50 years and looks like
continuing. But the fraction of seats only tells part of this story ￿the voting power indices
also suggest that there has been a steady fall in the voting power of the ALP in the post-war
period.13
These indices were computed under the assumption that the Liberals and Nationals did
not act as a single Coalition party. If this assumption is changed, what happens to the
ALP￿ s post-war voting power? The results are reported in Figure 2 below, and show that
the ALP￿ s voting power is signi￿cantly reduced.
Figure 2: ALP Voting Power in the Senate















% Seats SS Bz DP
13Following the 2004 election, the current Senate the indices for the ALP are: ’SS
ALP = 0:17619, ’Bz
ALP =
0:15888 and ’DP
ALP = 0:10455, a 70-year low for the ALP.
113.3 Voting Power of the Liberal Party and Coalition
Figure 3 presents the three measures of voting power discussed above for the Liberal Party
between 1949 and 2004, together with the fraction of Senate seats held by the Liberals.















% Seats SS Bz DP
Again, the ALP the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices track each other closely, with minor
di⁄erences between the two. The DP index is based on minimal winning coalitions instead
of the notion of pivotalness and so as expected gives di⁄erent results. Figure 3 suggests
that the Liberal Party￿ s relatively modest gains in the Senate since the late 1980s in terms
of seats has translated into a signi￿cant increase in voting power.
The indices in Figure 3 were computed under the assumption that the Liberals and
Nationals did not act as a single Coalition party. If this assumption is changed, we can
estimate the voting power of the Coalition. The results are reported in Figure 4 below. In
nearly all cases, the formation of the Coalition has increased the total voting power of the
Nationals and Liberals above what it would have been if they had acted as separate entities.
In terms of indices of voting power, the Coalition agreement has paid o⁄.
12Figure 4: The Whole Can Exceed the Sum of the Parts















% Seats SS Bz DP
3.4 Other Parties: The National Party, Australian Democrats and
Australian Greens
Figures 5, 6 and 7 below presents the three measures of voting power discussed above for
the National Party (1925-2004), Australian Democrats (1977-2004) and Australian Greens
(1990-2004) under the assumption that the Nationals and Liberals act as separate entities.
These estimates therefore provide upper bounds for the voting power of these minor parties
over the relevant periods. In contrast with the major parties, for the minor parties the
indices of voting power almost always exceed the fraction of seats obtained by each party
(which in turn exceeds the fraction of primary votes they obtain).





















% Seats SS Bz DP
*1925-1974 "Country Party"; 1975-1980 "National Country Party"; 1983-2004 "National Party"
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4 Concentration of Voting Power
In the industrial organisation (IO) literature, concentration measures provide a summary
of how competitive an industry is. Consider, for example, the sidely used Her￿ndahl￿







where, si ￿ qi=Q is ￿rm i￿ s market share. Note that H does indeed measure market
concentration. For example, if a single ￿rm in the industry is ￿dominant￿and has a very
high market share, then the H is large (close to one). On the other hand, if no ￿rm
￿dominates￿ , then each of the si are small, and so
PN
i=1 s2
i would be close to zero. In
general, 0 ￿ H ￿ 1, with a lower value indicating a ￿more competitive￿market. More
generally, following the axiomatization of concentration indices by Encaoua and Jacquemin





where g is an arbitrary, non-decreasing function with the property that sg (s) is convex in
s.
15Similar measures are used in political science to analyse the ￿e⁄ective number￿of political
parties. Let vi be the number of primary or ￿rst-place votes obtained by party i in an
election, and let si be the number of seats obtained by party i in an election. Natural
























vi and s =
X
i
si. See for example, Muller (2003, page 273). These measures
are just inverses of the HH index. We can compute similar measures with ’SS, ’Bz and
’DP to give an overall picture o⁄the concentration of voting power in the Australian Senate.







for each of our indices. Since 0 ￿ ’i ￿ 1 for all i, we also have 0 ￿ ’Con ￿ 1. A low
number would indicate that voting power is relatively dispersed, whereas a higher number
indicates relatively concentrated voting power.
Figure 8 below computes the concentration measure in (8) using fraction of seats, ’SS,
’Bz and ’DP, under the assumption that the Liberals and Nationals vote as separate parties
in the post-1949 period.























% Seats SS Bz DP
The results show that voting power was relatively heavily concentrated before the intro-
duction of proportional representation in 1949, but concentration has been low and has
declined steadily since that reform. The introduction of the single transferable vote not
only reduced concentration of seats and primary votes, but also reduced the concentration
of voting power.
5 Conclusion
This paper computed indices of voting power for the Australian Senate for its entire existence
using three well-known indices used in the literature. The indices are intended to provide
an a priori estimate of the degree of in￿ uence that a political party or voter can expect to
have over which legislation is passed. Our results show that the introduction in 1949 of the
single transferable vote in the Senate has had profound, long term e⁄ects on voting power.
First, power has become more dispersed. Second, the voting power of the ALP has been in
long term decline following this reform. Third, the Coalition parties have maintained their
voting power and have recently increased it signi￿cantly above their seat shares ￿a rarity
for larger parties in the postwar era.
The primary disadvantage of the measures presented and computed here is that they
17assume that all coalitions are equally likely to form. But political parties are well entrenched
in Australia and ideological, product branding or reputational considerations mean that some
coalitions are more likely to form than others. Incorporating these features into power indices
would require di⁄erent measures to be developed and estimated.
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